Why do legal disputes ever go to trial? Prior research emphasizes the role of mistakes, irrationalities, or asymmetric information because rational litigants with complete or symmetric information should choose pre-trial settlements over the costs and risks of trial. Using a dynamic incomplete-contracting framework, we provide an overlooked rationale for going to court. Even though risky and costly, going to court can be both rational and socially e¢ cient when a court decision enhances property rights and deters future costly litigation. Experimental evidence supports these predictions. Our …ndings provide new insights into the incidence of litigation and trial.
Introduction
Why do legal disputes ever go to trial? Early research predicted that rational litigants with complete information would avoid the costs and risks of trial by settling out of court (Landes 1971; Gould 1973; Posner 1973; Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979; Shavell 1982) . It follows that "A trial is a failure" (Gross and Syverud 1991) , and these and other papers have sought for alternative explanations. For example, trial could result from mistakes in strategy (Cooter et al 1982) , from structural features of the litigation setting such as agency problems between litigant and lawyer (Bibas 2004) , or from irrationalities such as framing or self-serving biases (Bibas 2004 ). Yet, the explanation that has received the most attention is that the trial results when litigants have di¤erent information. Parties may be asymmetrically informed about the likelihood of winning a trial (Bebchuk 1984 The basic logic of our argument is as follows. Litigants must expend costly resources preparing legal cases in property rights disputes. As in the incomplete-contracting literature (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) , agents can make short-term contracts (that is, settle out of court) but not long-term contracts. Going to trial has additional costs and is risky because the court's ruling is not known. However, by going to trial now, the litigant may deter future litigation and settlement, and their associated high costs. This is true even when the direction of the court's ruling is symmetrically not known by the litigants or when actors have complete information about the relative merits of their cases. In short, asymmetric information is not necessary for a trial to occur.
Three particular features of litigation and court procedures that a¤ect pre-trial bargaining are central to our argument. First, adversaries must expend costly resources, such as hiring lawyers and engaging in pretrial discovery, in order to make a claim in a dispute, regardless of whether the parties expect to go to court or settle. Second, trials are risky; even after pre-trial preparation, the outcome of the con ‡ict depends on factors outside of the litigants' control that are hard to predict. This risk may be assessed asymmetrically by the litigants, as is assumed in much of the previous literature, but such is not necessary as we show here.
Third, the winner of a trial enhances her position relative to her adversary not just today but also in the future because the trial verdict becomes the "law of the case" and the burden of proof shifts to the side that has lost. Another way of phrasing this is that a court decision enhances the property rights of the winner. 1 The …rst two features are widely recognized as relevant for pre-trial settlements (e. Previous research has acknowledged that this third feature matters, but how its crucial role in causing trial even with complete information has not been systematically articulated.
For example, Cooter et al (1982) acknowledge that this dynamic may a¤ect the incidence of trial but do not develop the logic; Che and Yi (1993) examine how establishing a precedent a¤ects the willingness of a defendant to settle out of court when facing multiple plainti¤s, yet they also assume asymmetric information; and Robson and Skaperdas (2008) model a similar two-period setting but address other questions and neither elaborate on nor test the robustness of its signi…cance.
We …rst present the simplest model that illustrates the logic. When the stream of pro…ts (i.e., the dispute horizon) is long enough, then there is no feasible out-of-court settlement that is better than the expected payo¤ of trial. The level of property rights security also matters. We consider property rights as imperfect in the sense that a court decision does not go with certainty to the presumed holder of a property right, and property rights are considered better de…ned and more secure the larger is the probability of winning in court for the presumed holder. We …nd that the better property rights are de…ned, the higher is the likelihood of settling out of court. Variations of the model -allowing for endogenous 1 A related point that enhances our argument, made by Buchanan (1989) is that, in the absence of a challenge in court, property rights can weaken and "atrophy." In some civil law systems, for example, the concept of usucapio might allow even a long-term renter, not just a squatter, to acquire title over a real asset.
litigation costs and allowing litigatns to have di¤erent dispute horizons -demonstrate the generality of this argument.
We next present results from a laboratory experiment in which we control both the degree of property rights security and the litigation horizon. Consistent with the theory, we …nd that subjects are more likely to choose trial when the litigation horizon is longer and when property rights are less secure. However, not all behavior conforms to the theory, and we show how the clarity in which information is conveyed to the subjects can in ‡uence their litigation decisions.
Our …ndings contribute to the literature on pre-trial settlement brie ‡y reviewed above.
We provide theory and experimental evidence of how the incidence of trials in complete information settings depends on both the pro…t horizon and the level of property rights security. We also show that trials can be e¢ cient by preventing costly litigation in the future.
That trials can be desirable has been noted before (e.g., Shavell 1982; Fiss 1984) , albeit for di¤erent reasons. Whereas prior researchers have emphasized that errors in judgement may lead to too many trials (e.g., Gross and Syverud 1991), we also …nd that errors in judgment may also lead to too few trials in settings with moderate or insecure property rights. Additionally, we provide new evidence that the incidence of errors in the settle-ortrial decision depends on the manner in which dispute-relevant information is presented to litigants, a …nding that has relevance to legal practitioners. These insights are discussed in greater detail at the end of the paper.
We also note that the laboratory proves to be a practical, even if imperfect, setting in which to test our theory. It is widely accepted that the cases that reach trial are not a random sample of all cases (e.g., Priest and Klein 1984; Lanjouw and Lerner 1998; Lederman 1999 ), yet without data on all cases it is di¢ cult to identify empirically why some cases reach trial and others do not. Moreover, it is impractical to randomly assign pro…t horizons and property rights to real-world litigants. In the laboratory, however, we can assign subjects into litigant roles and easily control the level of property rights security and the dispute horizon. A few experimental studies on pre-trial bargaining take advantage of these features (e.g., Stanley and Coursey 1990; Loewenstein et al 1993). Hewitt (2012) is the only prior experimental study of which we are aware that varies both property rights and the stakes, but his experiment is tailored to cross-industry licensing whereas ours focuses on generic property rights disputes.
Finally, we note that economists and political scientists have shown how a dynamic similar to our third feature matters in violent con ‡ict (e.g., Gar…nkel and Skaperdas 2000;
McBride and Skaperdas 2011; Powell 2006). Our paper is most closely related to McBride and Skaperdas (2011). They present a basic model of war that reveals these insights and conduct a laboratory experiment to explore human behavior in this con ‡ict setting. Our paper di¤ers by directly addressing the litigation setting and by controlling for di¤erent levels of property rights security.
2 An Illustrative Model: Settlement vs. Going to Court
The Model
Consider two litigants (or parties), A and B, who are in dispute over an asset that yields a return R > 0 in each period t = 1; 2; ::: An example of such an asset would be land with title that is contested by two parties. In each period, each party can contest the asset by paying a "litigation fee" L > 0: If both parties contest the asset, then they could bargain and settle on a disposition of the asset for that period or they could contest it in court, whereby both would have to pay a "court fee" C > 0: For settlement to occur, both parties would have to agree, whereas just one party could force a trial in court. If only one of the parties pays the litigation fee, then that party enjoys the return of the asset for that period, and the other party receives no return. If neither party pays the litigation fee, then neither receives a return on the asset. We suppose that both parties discount the future by the constant discount factor 2 (0; 1) :
A court decision in any particular period awards the asset to one party not just for this period but for all subsequent periods. That is, a court decision makes the title of the asset perfectly secure via a perfect form of legal precedence. 2 Let party A's probability of winning in court be p and party B's probability of winning be 1 p: Without loss of generality suppose p 1=2: Party A could be considered to have a temporary insecure title to the asset or "insecure property right," and p could be considered the court's ability to discriminate in favor of the right party, with a p closer to 1 signifying a greater ability of the court to discriminate in favor of the right party.
We have here assumed that the return on the asset is forgone if neither party prepares.
An alternative, perhaps more realistic to some litigation settings, is to suppose that the favored party (A) receives the return by default if no challenge is o¤ered, and that the favored party …rst observes the challenger's preparation decision before deciding to prepare.
We consider these possibilities in the next section and see that our main logic still applies.
But for now our current set-up enforces symmetry in all dimensions except for the likelihood of winning a trial. We can then be sure that our results do not hinge on some other form of asymmetry, such as default winner status.
The Settle or Go-to-court Decision
Suppose a period in which both parties have paid the litigation fee and face the choice between settlement and going to court. If they were to go to court, then their continuation payo¤s would be as follows:
Because each party has to pay the cost C to go to court, there is an incentive to settle and divide the returns of the asset, possibly in accordance with the winning probabilities but not necessarily only so. 3 Even better, the two parties would prefer to commit to such a division for the inde…nite future if they could …nd a way to prevent one another in the future from unilaterally paying the litigation fee and gaining access to the asset. But such a commitment is not credible in our setting, as it is not in many settings with unclear titles, and the parties could only settle in dividing only this period's asset returns under the threat of going to court.
Let s denote the fraction of the asset return that goes to party A with 1 s thus denoting the fraction that goes to party B. That is, if the two parties were to settle in this period, party A would receive a current payo¤ of sR while party B would receive
(1 s) R: There are many ways according to which bargaining could take place, but for simplicity we suppose that the two parties always split the surplus (or, given risk neutrality and symmetry, they use the Nash or any other symmetric bargaining solution). 4 Let s denote the corresponding Markov Perfect Equilibrium split of R, if the parties were to …nd one acceptable split. If that split were acceptable in this period, it would also be acceptable in all future periods and, therefore, the discounted continuation payo¤ of player A would
and similarly that for player B would be
The split-the-surplus rule implies that s can be obtained by solving
3 Going to court for both parties is always an equilibrium, regardless of whether a Markov Perfect Equilibrium with Settlement exists. In the remainder we concentrate on …nding conditions under which an equilibrium with settlement holds. 4 Another alternative simple bargaining subgame would involve having one party (say A) always make an o¤er with the other party being able only to accept or reject the o¤er. In such a case, the o¤ering party would have an advantage beyond that of having a higher winning probablity. None of the results depend on the particular protocol of bargaining that is adopted.
Substituting in V c
A and V c B de…ned in (1) and then simplifying, we arrive at
That is, the split-the-surplus settlement has the parties share the return R is in accordance with the winning probabilities.
The question is whether and when the two parties choose to settle instead of going to court. To do that, they both need to prefer settlement to con ‡ict. For litigant A, splitting the surplus with continuation payo¤ V s A is better than going to court when
For litigant B:
In short, when C 1 L, then both litigants prefer trial to settlement, and trial is the only equilibrium should both prepare. However, we note a technicality: because trial also results when just one chooses trial, there always exist an equilibrium in which both choose trial (conditional on both preparing). In e¤ect, if one party chooses trial, there is nothing the other party can do to prevent it. So when C < 1 L, there exist multiple equilibria, but when C 1 L there is a unique equilibrium.
Further observe that, conditional on both preparing, whenever a settlement equilibrium exists it is Pareto e¢ cient, and whenever it does not exist so that only possible equilibrium is going to court, then going to court is the Pareto e¢ cient outcome. Going to court is e¢ cient in the latter case because it resolves the property rights dispute and prevents future litigation expenditures.
From now on, we assume the parties can coordinate on the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium so that settlement is reached when it is preferred by both parties. We believe this is a reasonable assumption for two reasons. First, there is complete information, and the parties during pre-trial negotiation should be able to ascertain the best feasible settlement (e.g., Nash Bargaining). Second, there is experimental evidence that coordination on the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium is common in similar Hi-Lo games (see Bacharach 2006) .
We now give our …rst result.
Proposition 1 Suppose both parties pay the litigation fee. Then, settlement is more likely, and going to court less likely, to take place (i) the higher is the court fee C;
(ii) the lower is the litigation fee L; and (iii) the lower is the discount factor .
A higher court fee increases the cost of going to court and therefore makes settlement more likely. A higher litigation fee, because it has to be paid every period in the case of settlement, e¤ectively increases the cost of settlement. Because going to court, by clarifying property rights through precedence, eliminates the cost of paying these litigation fees in the future, having higher litigation fees makes going to court more attractive and thereby increases the likelihood of going to court. Finally, a higher discount factor increases the present value of the litigation fees that would be paid in the event of settlement and therefore also make going to court more likely.
The Legal Preparation Decision
Next consider the decision to prepare litigation. There are four possibilities: both prepare and go to trial; both prepare and settle; only one prepares; neither prepares. The simplest to consider is when neither prepares in every period, in which case each receives total payo¤ of 0 in each round. Given that neither prepares, a one-shot deviation to prepare yields payo¤ R L. Not preparing is better when 0 > R L, i.e., L > R.
Suppose a salient asset (R L) and that if both prepare then there is a legitimate threat of trial (C < 1 L). Consider the case where both prepare and go to trial. For A, it is better to prepare and go to trial than not prepare when
For B, the condition is
For both to pay the litigation fee, it must be true that
Thus, both prepare and go to trial when C < 1 L and L+C (1 p)
. Or, alternatively,
Keeping C < 1 L, now suppose one litigant prepares in each round, and the other does not prepare in each round. The preparer receives 1 1 (R L), and the non-preparer receives 0. The preparer prefers to prepare as long as R L. If A is the non-preparer, then not preparing is better than the deviation payo¤ when
If B is the non-preparer, we need (1 p)
Now consider a salient asset (R L) but with no legitimate threat of trial ( 1 L > C).
If both prepare, then A prefers preparing to a one-shot deviation to not prepare when
Similarly, B prefers preparing to a one-shot non-preparation when (1 p) R L. With
, both preparing and settling is an equilibrium when (1 p) R L.
Finally, consider when just one prepares with no legitimate threat of trial. The preparing receives R L, and with salient asset, preparing is optimal with no challenge. If A is the non-preparer, then not preparing is better than the one-shot deviation when 0 pR L ) L pR. While if B is the non-preparer, not preparing is better when L (1 p) R.
The following proposition highlights some important …ndings from this analysis. Supporting details are in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 Assume the asset is salient. Then:
(i) For high enough property rights protection (i.e., p su¢ ciently close to 1), the party with the weakest claim does not pay the litigation fee and the party with the higher claim prepares litigation to obtain e¤ective possession of the asset, whether or not there is a legitimate threat of trial.
(ii) The property right will be contested when the property right is su¢ ciently insecure (i.e., p su¢ ciently close to 1 2 ).
(iii) Negotiated settlement occurs when the property rights are su¢ ciently insecure (i.e., p su¢ ciently close to 1 2 ) and when the shadow of the future is su¢ ciently short (i.e., su¢ ciently close to 0).
(iv) Trial occurs when the property rights are su¢ ciently insecure (i.e., p su¢ ciently close to 1 2 ) and when the shadow of the future is su¢ ciently long (i.e., su¢ ciently close to 1).
Example 1
Let R = 100, L = 30, and C = 20, consider three property rights scenarios p = 0:5, 0:75, and 0:9, and suppose two discount factors = 0 and 0:75. The asset is salient, so at least one litigant will prepare. Moreover, the threat of litigation is not legitimate under the short horizon ( = 0), but it is under the long horizon ( = 0:75). Whether only one prepares or both prepare depends on the property rights security p. Table 1 lists the various equilibria of this example by property rights security and horizon.
When the property right is secure, only the owner prepares litigation. When the property right is su¢ ciently insecure, both prepare, and whether there is settlement or trial depends on the horizon. The litigants go to trial with su¢ ciently insecure property rights and a su¢ ciently long horizon. Figure 1 summarizes the above pictorially. The six dots in the …gure correspond to the six parameter con…gurations. As we will see in the next section, this general pattern remains under many changes to the basic model.
Variations
The …ndings of the illustrative model are robust to many changes in the model and for a variety of litigation settings. We now present two variations of the basic model. In the …rst variation, the two parties continue interacting over an in…nite horizon but choose litigation e¤orts endogenously with the probability of winning in court being endogenous as well. In the second variation a long-term agent faces a series of short-term agents who could challenge the long-term party. This variation could apply to patent or intellectual property rights disputes.
Endogenous Litigation E¤orts
Parties A and B interact the same way as before but now they choose particular levels of (non-negative) litigation e¤orts, l A and l B . (We can think of the "litigation fee" L as distinct from the litigation e¤ort and as the cost of challenge, which for now we set for simplicity at 0.) These e¤orts can include the cost of hiring lawyers, paralegals, and researchers who would help with preparation, discovery, and arguments that could be used in the event of going to court but also as a tool during the process of bargaining in the event of settlement.
The probability of winning in court now depends on the litigation e¤orts as well as on the degree of property rights enforcement. In particular, party A's probability of winning is:
Litigant B's probability of winning in court is
l A + l B > 0 (and, otherwise, equals 1 ). Note that when both parties choose the same level of litigation e¤ort, their probabilities of winning are and 1 . The parameter has the same interpretation as the exogenous probability in the previous section, as the degree of property rights protection with a (> 1=2) closer to 1 implying a greater ability of the court system to enforce property rights. In addition to the degree of property rights protection, the litigation e¤orts (e.g., the expenses on lawyers, research, discovery and so on) a¤ect the probability of winning in court. As will be shown, the litigation e¤orts, through their e¤ect on the probabilities of winning in court, also a¤ect the bargaining power and the share of the returns each party receives when the parties settle.
Clark and Riis (1998) axiomatized this functional form for the probability of winning, and In each period, the timing of the interaction of the two parties is as follows:
1. Levels of e¤orts, l A and l B , are chosen simultaneously by the two parties.
2. The parties negotiate in the shadow of the court and possibly settle. If both parties choose to settle, the settlement takes place; otherwise, the case goes to court and each side pays the court fee C. Settlement follows the split-the-surplus rule (such as the Nash bargaining solution).
3. The payo¤s for the period are realized. If there is a court decision, there is no further interaction between the two parties and the winner takes undisputed possession of the asset. If there is settlement, the game starts anew in the next period.
We consider the choices faced by the two parties at the beginning of stage 2, after they have made speci…c choices, (l A ; l B ), of litigation e¤orts. If the two parties were to go to court, their payo¤s over the remaining horizon of the game would be the following:
To derive the payo¤ functions for the case of settlement, we …rst need to determine the shares of R that each party would receive as a function of the litigation e¤orts. Continue denoting by s the current-period share received by party A and by 1 s the share received by party B. In addition, let s denote the Markov Perfect Equilibrium share that is to be received in subsequent periods if Settlement were to be an equilibrium and let (l A ; l B ) denote the equilibrium e¤orts that would be chosen in the future. Then, conditional on the choice of l A , the continuation payo¤ of party A would be sR +
and similarly for party B
(1 s)R+
The sharing rule based on the Nash bargaining solution (or any other symmetric bargaining solution) is determined by the s that solves the following equation:
The solution and the resultant sharing rule is
Note how the sharing rule depends on the degree of property rights protection parameter as well as on the litigation e¤orts of the two parties. Then, the payo¤ functions under settlement are as follows:
With these payo¤ functions, the Markov Perfect Equilibrium litigation e¤orts under Settlement (provided such an equilibrium exists) are ) and the degree of property rights protection, with higher protection (i.e., higher ) inducing lower litigation e¤orts. In addition, the equilibrium probability of winning for party A and the equilibrium share s are both equal to :
Settlement can be an equilibrium only if the continuation payo¤s under settlement are higher for both parties or
The two conditions hold only if
The following proposition summarizes the main …ndings of the game with endogenous litigation e¤orts.
Proposition 3 Consider the extended game in which both parties choose their level of litigation e¤ort. Then, from (7), Settlement is more likely, and going to court less likely, to take place (i) the higher is the court fee C;
(ii) the lower is the return on the asset R;
(iii) the lower is the discount factor ; and (iv) the better is the protection of property rights (i.e., the closer is to 1):
As before, higher court costs make settlement more likely. While in the simpler model of the previous section the value of the asset did not a¤ect the likelihood of settlement, now because it a¤ects the level of litigation e¤orts it also a¤ects the likelihood that the settlement equilibrium exists. A higher litigation fee, because it has to be paid every period in the case of settlement, e¤ectively increases the cost of settlement. Because going to court, by clarifying property rights, eliminates the cost of paying these litigation fees in the future, higher litigation fees also increase the likelihood of going to court. The e¤ect of a higher discount factor reducing the likelihood of settlement and making going to court more likely continues to hold in this extended setting. Finally, contrary to the case with exogenous probabilities of winning, the degree of property rights protection also a¤ects the likelihood that a Settlement equilibrium exists, with better property rights protection increasing that likelihood.
A Long-term Party Against a Series of Short-term Potential Challengers
The models examined thus far involve two parties that are involved in a long-term legal but potentially decisive dispute. For example, they might have competing claims on a productive asset which they can exploit jointly under a series of short-term agreements (that is, under the Settlement outcome), backed by their respective litigation expenditures, or they could resolve once-and-for-all in court. We now examine a variation of the basic model with one long-term agent potentially facing a series of short-term agents who could sue the long-term agent for damages. This setting probably better …ts patent or intellectual property rights disputes. We show how the main comparative-static result of the e¤ect of the shadow of the future readily extends to such settings.
Consider a long-term agent A, with an inde…nite horizon, who faces in each period a short-term potential challenger b (each lasting one period) who could sue agent A for the rights to a one-time payment of R. To sue A, a challenger would have to incur a …xed cost of L > 0. If no court decision has taken place in the past, let p denote the probability of winning in court of agent A; with 1 p thus representing the challenger's probability of winning. We suppose that p 1=2 (so that A can be thought of as having a better initial property right than the challengers). If sued, agent A incurs a legal cost L A > 0 regardless of whether the two sides go to court or not; this cost can be thought of as the cost of hiring a legal team that would help A with the possible settlement and pre-trial costs but also preparing for the eventuality of going to court. If the two sides were to go to court, both would incur an additional cost c > 0.
We suppose that A can make a Settlement o¤er to b, which the latter accepts or rejects.
Once b has sued (and has paid cost L), his expected payo¤ of going to court is First, if A were to make the payment S o and then continue doing so to each future challenger, her payo¤ would be
Note that for the challenger in each period to choose to sue, it must be the case that the settlement payment received from A is higher than the cost of suing, or
As this is the interesting case, we suppose that this condition is satis…ed for the remainder of this section.
Going to court yields more complicated long-term outcomes. If the court decides in favor of A, then all future challengers b face worse odds of winning in the future. Let q h (> p) denote A's future probability winning in court in the future. Conversely, if A loses in court following an initial challenge, her future probability of winning decreases to q l (< p).
To determine the expected payo¤s of going to court, we thus need to determine the expected payo¤s in the case of a court win and and in the case of a court loss.
Suppose that in the case of a win, A would not be challenged in the future. (This could be assured if L > (1 q h ) R c, the latter being the expected payo¤ of a challenger.) 6 Then, the value of having a probability of winning of q h from next period onward would be
In the case of a loss, there will always be a challenge given that (1 q l )R c > (1 p)R c which by assumption is greater or equal than L: Then, there is the possibility of settlement and that of going to court, again, in that case. Suppose …rst the case of settlement. Each challenger b would receive in each period a settlement payment S l = (1 q l )R c; with the
: Therefore, if there is settlement when A loses after going to court the …rst time, the expected payo¤ of going to court is
In that case, A will choose to go to Court if and only if
Because both sides of this inequality are positive, the range of parameters that would result in going to court is larger the higher is . In other words, the e¤ect of the shadow of the future holds in this setting, a setting that involves less decisive con ‡ict than that of the other model. Furthermore, the e¤ects of the return of the asset (R), or the cost of going to court (c), and of the degree of protection of property rights (p) are similar in the previous models we have examined.
These e¤ects continue to hold under still richer variations of this setting. For example, if A's win probability, once it drops after a loss may later rise again after a win, then the shadow of the future e¤ect still operates. We thus see that the shadow of the future looms large across many settings and how it can induce a party to go to court in equilibrium.
4 Experiment Design
Basics
We conducted four experiment sessions at a large public university using university students as test subjects. The experiment was implemented via computer using the z-Tree experimental platform (Fischbacher 2007 ). The experimental laboratory recruits university students via emails and posted ‡yers. After learning of the laboratory, students register to be in the subject pool via a web site. When an experiment session is scheduled, the time and place of the experiment are posted on the recruiting web site, and an email with the time and place information is sent to students in the subject pool. Subjects then sign-up for that session via the recruiting web site. Subjects were allowed to participate in at most one session. Experiment decisions were made using "points" as the experimental currency.
At the end of the experiment, the subject would exchange the points earned for actual U.S.
currency. Each subject was given a $7 show-up payment. The average total take-home amount (including show-up payment) was $24 for about 75 minutes of participation. A total of 144 subjects participated. Only one student reported having a major related to law (Criminal, Law, and Society).
Treatments and Sessions
Our experiment implements the basic model from Section 2 but with a modi…cation that converts the in…nite horizon into a …nite horizon with equivalent expected payo¤s described in detail below. We vary two treatment variables: the degree of property rights p and the dispute horizon .
We consider the three levels of property rights security from the earlier example: p = 0:5, 0:75, and 0:9. We denote these insecure, moderate, and secure property rights, respectively.
We also refer to these as the 50-50, 25-75, and 10-90 property rights scenarios.
We consider two dispute horizons, short and long, which also mimic those of the earlier example in Section 2.4. The short horizon consists of a single dispute over 100 points, which is equivalent to = 0. The long horizon consists of a dispute over a stream of four 100-point allotments, which is expected payo¤ equivalent to = 0:75.
Each session consisted of three phases: instructions, decisions, and questionnaire. The decisions phase entailed multiple matches (legal disputes), with each match consisting of a single, independent property rights dispute over an announced number of points. The degree of property rights was held …xed in each session, but the dispute horizon varied within each session. Speci…cally, the subjects engaged in 15 matches with short horizon and then 15 matches with long horizon. We can thus label the three sessions: 10-90, 25-75, and 50-50. A fourth session, labeled 50-50B, used 50-50 property rights with a more explicit representation of the expected payo¤s than in the other three sessions. Basic information about the subjects that participated in each session is listed in Table 2 .
Single Match, Short Horizon
A single, short horizon match, denoted T = 1, proceeds as follows. First, the subjects are randomly and anonymously paired.
Second, each subject is given an endowment of 60 points and told her type, i.e., the probability that she would win a trial if a trial occurs. There are two "weak" types (10 and 
Single Match, Long Horizon
The long horizon (T = 4) dispute setting is structured to mimic a four-period dispute, where each period has 100 points disputed for a total of 400 points but simpli…ed so that only one prepare-settle-court decision is made. Because out of court settlements do not have the permanence of court decisions, we assume that settling today yields preparation and settlement in each period, while non-preparation or a court ruling implies no future dispute.
Speci…cally, a long horizon match proceeds as follows.
First, the subjects are randomly and anonymously paired.
Second, each subject is given an endowment of 240 points (60 points for each of the four presumed periods) and told the probability that she would win a trial if a trial occurs.
Third, each subject decides whether or not to prepare a legal case. The cost of preparing a legal case in the …rst period is 30 points. If both do not prepare cases, then each receives 0 points, and forgoes any claim on the points so the match ends. If one subject prepares and the other does not, then the one that prepares receives all 400 points, for a …nal payment of 400 30 = 370. The non-preparer receives 0 points. If both prepare cases, then the match continues.
Fourth, if the match continues, then an out-of-court settlement is proposed in which each party receives a share of the …rst round's 100 points equal to her probability of winning in court. Re ‡ecting the subgame perfect equilibrium, we further assume that the settlement agreed in the …rst period is replicated in the remaining three periods, so that in each of the last three periods each party receives 100p i points and pays 30 points, for a …nal payment 
Other Details
After arriving at the laboratory, the subjects are seated at computers. Each then reads the instructions (see Appendix B) individually on her computer and answers two test questions.
The instructions present the basic structure of the decision making environment. The endowment of points is given to prevent a subject from experiencing bankruptcy. Figure 2 displays the two decision screens. After the last match but before leaving the laboratory, each subject answered a brief questionnaire that asked for age, sex, major, year in school, number of economics courses taken, number of statistics courses taken, and so on (see Appendix C).
We use information from the questionnaire to obtain basic information about the subjects.
Theoretical Predictions and Experiment Hypotheses
The experiment parameters match in expected payo¤ terms the example from Section 2.4, so the equilibria described in Table 1 and Figure 1 provide the equilibrium predictions. The predicted dispute-level outcomes and individual-level strategies are more explicitly described in Table 3 .
Observe that we predict di¤erent dispute outcomes under the di¤erent horizons and property rights regimes. The 10-90 setting has property rights su¢ ciently secure such that the increase in horizon leads to a change in o¤-path behavior but not on-path behavior. The 25-75 setting with intermediate property rights sees a more striking change. The increase in horizon induces a challenge by the weak party that yields a trial; that is, we see both a higher rate of pre-trial litigation preparation and an increase in trial incidence. Under the 50-50 setting, the property rights are su¢ ciently insecure to create high pre-trial litigation but not large enough to induce trial when the horizon is small, while under the large horizon, we see the same high level of pre-trial litigation but now trial-averting settlements cannot be reached.
Our …rst two experiment hypotheses follow.
Hypothesis 1 (Litigation Preparation) As the horizon increases from T=1 to T=4, the incidence of legal preparation will:
(a) not change under very secure property rights 10-90. Because the go-to-court decision may change o¤ the equilibrium path in many treatment conditions, it is possible that over-preparation in those conditions may necessitate that the go-to-court decision be made. Our third hypothesis considers go-to-court decisions o¤ the equilibrium path.
Hypothesis 3 (Incidence of Trial O¤-path) As the horizon increases from T=1
to T=4 and conditional on both preparing, the incidence of trial will increase under each property rights regime.
Dispute outcomes result from an interplay of two litigants'decision, but looking closer at the individual strategies can illuminate how the aggregated dispute outcome arises. Our next hypothesis considers individual strategies.
Hypothesis 4 (Individual Strategies) As the horizon increases from T=1 to T=4:
(a) Type 10 subjects will switch from (not prepare, not court) to (not prepare, court).
(b) Type 25 subjects will switch from (not prepare, not court) to (prepare, court).
(c) Type 50, 75, and 90 subjects will switch from (prepare, not court) to (prepare, court). Figure 3 reports the average number of legal cases prepared per dispute for each session in all rounds, the average in the later rounds (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) , and the prediction. In the secure (Session 10-90), insecure (50-50), and the short horizon of the moderately secure setting (25-75), the preparations align closely with the predicted levels (Session 50-50B results will be discussed separately below). In the long horizon of Session 25-75, the legal preparations are closer to 1 than the predicted 2.
Results

Hypothesis 1: Incidence of Legal Case Preparation
Hypothesis 1 predicted that an increase in the horizon from short to long would not a¤ect legal preparation in Sessions 10-90 and 50-50, but would increase legal preparation in 25-75. Visual inspection of the …gures suggests con…rmation of these qualitative results, and the hypothesis is more formally con…rmed by the regressions presented in Table 4 and by non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum tests (not shown for space limitations). The key variable is Dummy Long Horizon, which takes value 1 if the long horizon and takes value 0 if short horizon. A positive and statistically signi…cant value for this coe¢ cient implies that the incidence of trial is higher under the long horizon than under the short horizon. For additional perspective, Figure 4 plots the time series of average prepared and average go to court (conditional on both preparing).
Thus, although there is much less legal preparation than predicted in the long horizon with moderate property rights (Session 25-75), the behavior largely matches the predicted qualitative change predicted in Hypothesis 1.
Hypotheses 2 and 3: Incidence of Trial
Changes in the incidence of trials due to a change in horizon present a mixed picture, as seen in Figure 5 and Table 5 . While the overall (unconditional) incidence of trial increases under moderate property rights as predicted, it is also the case that contrary to the prediction the overall incidence of trial increases under secure property rights (10-90) and has no change under insecure property rights (50-50). Wilcoxon tests yield the same picture (not shown).
An initial conclusion is that the predictions about overall incidence of trial are thus matched in only one of the three horizons. Closer examination, however, suggests some nuance. In the secure property rights setting (10-90), the unconditional incidence of trials is very low under both horizons (0.11 and 0.20, respectively), and even though it is a statistically signi…cant increase, it is still close the equilibrium prediction of no trials under secure property rights. Thus, though the behavior in session 10-90 technically does not tightly match Hypothesis 1(a), the level behavior in that session is similar to the prediction.
Of course, the unconditional incidence of trials does not distinguish between the two kinds of decision errors. A trial results when each party chooses both to prepare and to go to court, so the overall measure re ‡ects a con ‡ation of both decisions. For example, the overall incidence of trials could go down even when the rate of going to court, conditional on both being prepared, goes up if the rate of legal preparation goes down to a su¢ cient degree. To more closely isolate the trial decisions, consider the incidence of trials conditional on both parties being prepared, with regression results in Panel B of Table 5 (…gures not shown). These regressions, which more directly capture the incidence of trials among cases where trial is an immediate possibility, reveal that the change in conditional incidence of trial matches the prediction under the secure property rights (10-90) but only weakly matches under the moderately property rights (25-75). It does not match the prediction under insecure property rights (50-50).
The emergent picture is that behavior matches the theory fairly well with secure property rights, matches the theory less well but is somewhat consistent with moderately secure property rights, and does not match well with insecure property rights.
Session 50-50B
There are various possible reasons why behavior in the insecure property rights setting di¤ers dramatically from the prediction. One is that the subjects in the 50-50 session had unobserved preferences that were systematically di¤erent than the other subjects and the assumed utility functions of the model. Such would be the case if, for example, the 50-50 subjects got a large thrill from going to court that swamped out other incentives, thus making their behavior unresponsive to the change in payo¤s. That experimental subjects in contests are more aggressive than assumed in expected payo¤ maximization models (Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta 2012) is evidence that this possibility should not be immediately dismissed.
However, we contend that another explanation is warranted for two reasons. First, because we …nd a response to the expected payo¤s as the horizon changes in the 10-90 and 25-75 sessions, and because the subjects are randomly assigned the property rights treatments, it is unlikely that the pattern merely re ‡ects a property of the sample size.
Second, attributing the anomalous behavior to other psychological factors closes the door on other viable alternative explanations that could lend new insights into the incidence of trial.
We here explore one such alternative, namely, that the expected payo¤ calculation in the 50-50 setting is less transparent than in the 25-75 and 10-90 settings, thus resulting in more behavior that di¤ers substantially from the predicted behavior. In e¤ect, the expected payo¤ calculations for the secure and moderate property rights setting are more transparent because the asymmetry in strength makes the dispute decisions more easy to identify. For example, it is clear to a weak party to not challenge a strong party when the horizon is short. Even if the subjects in the 10-90 and 25-75 settings are imprecise in calculating expected payo¤s, then they may still intuit a decision relatively close to optimal. In the symmetric 50-50 case, however, the subject cannot use the asymmetry to aid in identifying an appropriate strategy but must instead make an expected payo¤ calculation. In presenting the information about payo¤s to the subjects, we did not report expected payo¤s but rather reported probabilities and outcome-contingent payo¤s. The subject must then calculate the expected payo¤ for herself.
We conducted the 50-50B session to explore this possibility. The 50-50B session is identical to the 50-50 session except the subjects are also shown an explicit expected payo¤s table when making their decision. We thus have the following conjecture:
Hypothesis 5 (Expected Payo¤ Clarity) Behavior in Session 50-50B will more closely match the predictions of Hypotheses 1-3 than behavior in Session 50-50. Tables 4 and 5 report the observed behavior from Session 50-50B.
Figures 3 and 5 and
As expected, we see a sharper change in the incidence of trial as the horizon is increased in the 50-50B session than in the original 50-50 session. Overall, the behavior in 50-50B
matches Hypotheses 2 and 3 much better than the 50-50 behavior. This is strong evidence that clarity in the expected payo¤ brings behavior more closely in line with the theoretical predictions.
The behavior matches Hypothesis 1 less well, though, we argue, adequately well. The prediction is no change in legal case preparation as the horizon increases under insecure property rights, and we see a statistically signi…cant increase. This is due to a smaller level of preparation in the short horizon in 50-50B than in 50-50, as seen in Figures 3(c) and 3(d) .
We note, however, that despite this drop, the level of preparation is still very high and close to the predicted level. Why the preparation is lower in the 50-50B short horizon than in the 50-50 short horizon is not clear, but we interpret the overall evidence as largely consistent with our prediction.
Hypothesis 4: Individual Strategies
Because the court decision is only made if both litigants prepared legal cases, there will be cases where we cannot know for sure what a subject would have done if presented with a litigation choice. Perfect identi…cation of complete strategies is thus impossible in our multistage game.
This di¢ culty is seen in Table 6 , which presents the proportion of subjects that selected di¤erent observable choice patterns. Choices that would be observed if both litigants played the predicted strategy are boxed by single lines. Double lines box the choice that would be observed by a subject when she chose the predicted strategy but the other subject did not.
Under the short horizon (T=1), we see observed choices match predicted observed choices around 70% of the time for all subject types in the 10-90, 25-75, and 50-50B sessions.
Including appropriate o¤-path behavior raises it to as much as 90% for the strong litigant in the 10-90 session. The exception is the 50-50 session, which as discussed earlier, may be explained by poor expected payo¤ calculations.
Under the long horizon (T=4), observed behavior matches observed predicted behavior about 80% of the time in the secure property rights setting. In other settings, however, we see deviations from the prediction. In the moderate setting (25-75), a large number of weak litigants (58%) do not prepare legal cases. Many strong litigants thus do not have to make the go to court decision. Those that do overwhelmingly choose to go to court as predicted, which indicates that it is the weak litigants that are deviating from prediction and not the strong litigants. The picture di¤ers with insecure property rights. The equally strong litigants both prepare as predicted, but they also avoid court when they should not.
The trial decisions tell a similar story but with nuance because many of these choices occur o¤ the predicted equilibrium path and have small numbers. Behavior matches prediction in all cases except strong litigants too frequently go to court when they should not under moderate property rights with short horizon. Given that there are very few observations for this case, we cannot ascertain whether this is a result of the small sample or some other systematic behavioral pattern such as overcon…dence.
Conclusion
This paper presents a rationalist explanation for why trials may occur with complete infor- 
APPENDIX
A Details for Proposition 2
The conditions obtained in Section 2.3 yield the following equilibria:
1. If R < L, then the asset is not salient, and the unique equilibrium is neither prepares.
2. If R > L so the asset is salient, then:
(a) If C < 1 L so the threat of trial is legitimate, then:
L then there is an equilibrium in which A does not prepare and B prepares.
L, then there is an equilibrium in which A prepares and B does not prepare.
L, then there is an equilibrium in which both prepare and go to trial. You are about to participate in a study of decision-making, and you will be paid for your participation in cash, privately at the end of this session. What you earn depends partly on your decisions and partly on chance.
Please turn o¤ your cellular phones now. Please close any program you may have open on the computer.
During this session, you will be matched with other participants multiple times. All matches take place through the computer terminals. It is important that you do not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the sessions.
When you are ready, please hit Continue to advance through the instructions. NOTE: Once you hit Continue, you cannot go back to previous screens. Screen 2: Instruction 1
During each match, the computer will randomly pair you with another participant in the room and give you an initial allotment of 60 points to use when making your decisions. You and the other participant are parties in a dispute over 100 points. You will make at most two decisions: …rst, whether or not to prepare a court case, and second, if both of you prepared cases, whether to settle out of court or to go to court. Here are the details of those decisions.
Each of you …rst must decide whether or not to prepare a legal case against the other. Preparing a legal case costs 30 points. Think of this legal case preparation fee as re ‡ecting the costs of hiring a lawyer, creating documents, …ling paperwork, discovering facts pertinent to the case, and so on.
If you do not prepare a legal case, then you have no legal claim over the points, and you receive 0 of the disputed 100 points. You receive 0 of those points whether or not the other participant prepared a case. You do nothing else in this match.
If you do prepare a legal case at a cost of 30 points and the other participant does not prepare a case, then you win all of the 100 points at no further cost, and the match ends.
If both of you prepare legal cases, then, after paying the legal preparation fee of 30 points, you will be told a proposed split of the 100 points between you and the other participant. This proposed split is the proposed out-of-court settlement. You must decide whether to accept this out-of-court settlement or to go to court.
If both of you choose to settle out of court, then you each receive the respective portions of the proposal. If one or both of you decide to go to court, then you must each pay a court fee of 20 points. This court fee involves the additional cost of your lawyer in court, additional paperwork, and so on. If the case goes to court, your chance of winning in court will be randomly assigned by the computer to be either 90% or 10%, and your partner's chance of winning in court will be randomly assigned either 10% or 90%.
When you are ready, please hit Continue to see an example.
Screen 3: Example
Consider the following example. The total prize is 100; your legal preparation fee is 30; your court fee is 20; your chance of winning in court is 90% and your partner's chance of winning in court is 10%. If you both prepare legal cases, then the proposed settlement for you is 90, and the proposed settlement for your partner is 10. After paying the legal preparation fee of 30, settling out of court leaves a net payo¤ of 60 (=90-30) for you and -20 (=10-30) for your partner.
The Legal Preparation Table below summarizes the fees, out-of-court settlement proposals, and chances of winning a court case in one scenario. The BLUE number in the table represents your payo¤, and the GREEN number in the table represents the other participant's payo¤. This table will be shown when you make your decision to prepare or not prepare a legal case.
If you or the other participant do not prepare a legal case, then this match ends. If you both prepare a legal case, you must each decide whether to settle out of court or to go to court. And your chance of winning in court is either 90% or 10%. The Court Decision Table will be shown in the next screen.
When you are ready, please hit Continue.
Screen 4: Example-cont
If both you and the other participant paid to prepare legal cases, then you will be shown the Court Decision Table, which is displayed below. This table summarizes the possible payo¤s after legal cases have been prepared and legal fees already paid. Again, your payo¤s are in BLUE. Notice that the 30 point legal preparation fee has already been subtracted and so is not displayed in the table.
The proposed settlement re ‡ects the chances of winning. For example, if you have a 90% chance of winning a court case, then the proposed settlement has you receive 90 out of the 100 points.
If you both decide to settle out of court, then you will receive the proposed settlement amount. If one or both of you decide to go to court, then both you and the other participant pay the court fee of 20 points, and the court decides who receives all 100 points.
Screen 5: Instruction 2
At the start of each match, the left side of your screen will display the Legal Preparation Table. On the right side of your screen, you will use the mouse to make your decision whether to prepare or not prepare a legal case. To make your decision, you must select the button corresponding to your preferred option.
If one or both did not prepare a legal case, then the match ends. If both prepared a legal case, then a new screen will appear. This new screen will display the Court Decision Table on the left. If both you and the other participant prepared cases, then on the right side of your screen you will make your decision to settle out of court or to go to court.
At the bottom of the screen is a history box which will display the information about prior matches.
When you are ready, please hit Continue. Only the winner of a court case pays the court fee. Answer: The correct answer is FALSE. Both participants in a case that goes to court must pay the court fee.
Please hit the Continue to go to the last page of instructions. Screen 9: Instruction 3
You will now participate in 15 matches, after which you will receive additional instructions.
IMPORTANT: You will be paid for only one of those 15 matches. After completing the 15 matches, the computer will randomly select which of the 15 matches you will be paid. At the end of the experiment you will exchange each point for $0.035 ($1 per 28.5 points) in addition to the $7 show-up payment.
Remember that in each match you will be randomly paired with a participant in the room, so there is a very low chance that you will be paired with the same participant two matches in a row.
Click Continue to proceed.
Screen 10: Short Horizon
This …rst part will consist of 15 matches. Remember, you will be randomly assigned to a di¤erent participant for each match, and the computer will randomly select one of those matches to be the match for which you will be paid.
Also remember that in each match you will be given 60 points to use for making your decisions.
You have been matched with another participant and are now in a dispute over 100 points. Your legal preparation fee is 30 points, and your court fee is 20 points. If you both prepare legal cases, then your chance of winning in court will be randomly assigned by the computer to be either 90% or 10%, and your partner's chance of winning in court will be randomly assigned either 10% or 90%.
When you are ready, please click continue.
Screen 10: Long Horizon
One of the 15 matches you just completed has been randomly selected by the computer for your payment. You will be told which match was selected for payment at the end of the experiment.
You will now participate in another 15 matches. As before, you will be paid for only one of these 15 matches.
However, now each match consists of four rounds. The decision you make in the …rst round will determine your payo¤ for all four rounds. So, as in the matches you have already completed, you make the preparation and court decisions at most ONCE per match.
You and the other participant are disputing 400 points (100 points for each of the four rounds). If in the …rst round you both prepare and settle out of court, then you both agree to prepare and settle IN EACH ROUND. If, however, the case goes to court in the …rst round, then the winner of the trial receives all the points for the …rst round and all additional rounds without having to prepare a legal case in rounds 2, 3, and 4.
As before, your legal preparation fee is 30 points, and your court fee is 20 points. If you both prepare legal cases, then your chance of winning in court will be randomly assigned by the computer to be either 90% or 10%, and your partner's chance of winning in court will be randomly assigned either 10% or 90%.
For example, if you both prepare legal cases and one of you chooses to go to the court, then the winner in court will receive all 400 of the disputed points minus the legal preparation and court fees, and the loser in court will pay 50 (=-(30+20)) points in fees. If you both choose to settle out of the court, then you both agree to prepare and settle every round. The proposed settlement over the disputed 400 points is 360 (=90x4 rounds) for you if your chance of winning in court is 90%, or 40 (=10x4 rounds) for you if your chance of winning in court is 10%. After subtracting the legal preparation fees, your net payo¤ from the dispute would thus be either 240 (=360-(30 in fees for 4 rounds)=360-120) points or -80 (=40-(30 in fees for 4 rounds)=40-120) points. This out of court settlement payo¤ is the same for the other participant.
In each match you will be given 240 points to use for making your decisions. Remember, you will be paid for only one of these 15 matches.
When you are ready, please click continue. 
Dummy Long Horizon
Notes: Standard errors in parenthses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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